Preventative, 'soft' counter-terrorism 
working within these institutions -to implement Prevent by showing, 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism ' (HMG, 2015: 2) and by identifying and reporting any individuals (even children) displaying signs of being 'at risk' from extremism. In the case of schools and further education colleges, this new duty merely confirmed obligations already enforced by the government educational inspectorate, OFSTED, following the so-called 'Trojan Horse' affair that involved allegations of 'extremism' within Birmingham schools (Miah, 2017) . This significant expansion of securitisation and associated 'pre-crime' approaches into educational and welfare spaces has attracted both scrutiny and criticism (e.g. Churchill, 2015; Dodd, 2015; Taylor, 2015, Open Society Foundation Justice Initiative (OSFJI), 2016), focusing on troubling examples of Muslim students being referred to the Channel anti-extremism mentoring scheme on questionable, and in some cases laughable, bases (although some specific cases are contested: BBC, 2016) . Such examples and the very active foregrounding of them by anti-Prevent campaigners and trade unions (OSFJI, 2016) , has highlighted how this contested policy approach of Prevent has steadily moved to being 'toxic' for many people. These concerns have been reflected and amplified both by mainstream media and by senior political figures. David Anderson QC, the government's previous Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation did NOT have responsibility for scrutiny of Prevent (that is apparently done by the 'Prevent Oversight Board', but government will neither publish its minutes nor even confirm its membership: Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), 2016) but was so concerned by evidence presented to him that he called for an independent review of Prevent (OSFJI, 2016) . This call was re-iterated by the report on 'Counter-Extremism' produced by Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights (2016) . In discussing the government's proposal to move forward with an ill-defined policy measure on 'countering extremism', the Joint Committee bluntly said:
The experience of the Prevent Strategy should inform any new legislation.
There should be an independent review of the Prevent Strategy to provide evidence as to what works and what simply drives wedges between the authorities and communities (JCHR:2016, 5).
The JCHR report went on to note 'several stories of what appeared to be heavy-handed referrals under the Prevent Duty ' (ibid:16) , so demonstrating the political concern over Prevent's impacts. There is a danger, however, that this increasingly wide, fierce and arguably well-justified criticism of Prevent's intent and concrete societal impacts is obscuring more complex understandings of this policy approach. Some of the criticism characterises Prevent's content and focus as being what it was when launched in 2007, rather than the significantly different current content. This doesn't imply that Prevent is now more positive but, as discussed below, rather that it is significantly different and that understanding both the nature and experiences of these changes matters.
More specifically, the criticism of Prevent risks both downplaying the complexity and contestation of Prevent within the broad 'state' and also implicitly characterising front-line education and welfare institutions as willing tools of state Islamophobia and surveillance. Such an approach fails to acknowledge engaged contestation by local authorities and front-line professionals as well as by Muslim community organisations throughout Prevent's history. Here, I identify the importance of the concept of 'policy enactment' (Braun et al, 2010) , the ways in which ground-level state and community-led agencies and their individual 'street-level bureaucrats' (Lipsky, 2010) mediate and enact national policies, so often leading to policy operation at ground-level that looks significantly different from that described in elitelevel political and media discourse. Within this article's general concern with Prevent's change and complexity, I particularly focus on its changing emphasis on 'responsibilisation' (McGhee, 2010) and on how this has provoked, and is still provoking, changing types of contestation by communities, local authorities and professional practitioners at ground level.
The article first briefly identifies the conceptual flaws that have shaped the negative reality and public perception of Prevent, and the changes in the content and focus of Prevent. It then goes on to identify and discuss the key theoretical concepts of 'responsibilisation' and 'enactment' that have shaped the changing nature of ground-level contestation within Prevent, before critically discussing the shifting focus of 'responsibilisation' and the response of changing modes of contestation within the Prevent Strategy. This includes consideration of emerging research data around changing forms of contestation in the wake of the 2015 Prevent legal duty.
Prevent's conceptual flaws
Britain's Prevent Strategy was arguably the first post 9/11 attempt to operationalise 'soft', preventative counter-terrorism policies and it has been since significantly studied and copied by other states (Ragazzi, 2014; Government of Canada, 2011) . Arguably (see Thomas,2012) , the negative public framing and interpretation of Prevent highlighted above has been shaped by fundamental flaws in its original design and operationalisation. In some cases, subsequent modifications have attempted to ameliorate these flaws but the negative public understanding of Prevent is settled, based on the original centrality of those flaws. These four key flaws are identified and briefly summarised here.
The first and undoubtedly most damaging flaw was Prevent's original, explicit focus on Muslims only (DCLG, 2007 a and b; Thomas, 2010) on a large scale, using crude demographic data, so clearly portraying British Muslims as an undifferentiated, 'suspect' community (Hickman et al, 2010) . The government evaluation of the initial 'Pathfinder' year of 2007-8 proudly highlighted Prevent's engagement with almost 50,000 young Muslims (DCLG, 2008) . This was re-enforced by overt attempts to engineer different types of community leadership through the establishment of national Muslim Women's and Youth 'Advisory Groups' and the policy prioritisation of similar approaches at the local level. Alongside this came the, frankly astonishing, state promotion of supposedly more 'moderate' Islamic theological interpretation through the 'Radical Middle Way' roadshows and the short-lived 'Sufi Muslim Council' (Thomas, 2012) .Sociologist Stuart Hall (BBC, 2011) characterised this as an unprecedented level of policy 'penetration' within an ethnic community, and this large and high-profile programme had the dual impact of both re-enforcing wider societal suspicion of Muslims (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012) and of also re-enforcing feelings of stigmatisation and defensive identifications within Muslim communities (Thomas and Sanderson, 2011 (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001) . Here, the unintended consequence of pre-2001 policy approaches aimed at tackling ethnic inequalities had been a hardening of ethnic divides and separate identifications. The policy solution proposed had been 'community cohesion' an overt focus on commonality and crosscommunity dialogue. For some, this shift in language and priorities appeared to be a lurch back to assimiliationism (Back et al, 2002) . However, empirical research suggests (Thomas, 2011) community cohesion policies at ground level were both demonstrating progressive practice through 'contact-theory' based work (Hewstone et al, 2007 ) that both worked with existing identifications and strengthened commonality, and were strongly supported by ground-level practitioners (Jones, 2013 ). Prevent's policy determination to only work with Muslims and to therefore only fund Muslim communities had the predictable impact of creating 'resource-envy' in other communities (see evidence given to House of Commons, 2010) . Whilst the Labour government's original approach was a 'twin-track' one whereby local community cohesion work was funded to the same extent as local Prevent work, the sheer weight of political prioritisation of Prevent first sidelined community cohesion nationally (O'Toole at al, 2013) and locally (Monro et al, 2010; Thomas, 2014) before national government officially washed its hands of a policy concern with cohesion and ethnic integration (DCLG, 2012) .
Another key flaw within Prevent was its operationalisation of the problematic model of 'radicalisation' (Kundnani, 2012) with its belief that individual journeys towards violent extremism can be predicted, monitored and prevented. At first, this was not explicit because the 'Prevent 1' stage of local work seemed to promote a community development approach, albeit one funded by an overt counter-terrorism strategy. Here, at ground-level the Lastly, this flaw of foregrounding of the concept of 'radicalisation' has meant that Prevent promoted the increasing securitisation of community relations by the overt involvement of the Police in day to day contact with Muslim communities through the lens of counter-terrorism, creating a reality of 'policed multiculturalism' (Ragazzi, 2014) . This has been hardened and deepened by the subsequent rolling out of mundane practices of surveillance around the Channel scheme and the 'Prevent duty' discussed below. This analysis supported arguments (Thomas, 2009 (Thomas, , 2010 that Prevent, in its initial form, was counter-productive on its own stated terms of prevention and of winning the public co-operation and 'human intelligence' necessary to defeat violent extremism. However, the reality of Prevent has been one of significant change, complexity and contestation and this is discussed below.
The changing reality of Prevent
Two distinct phases can be identified within Prevent's trajectory. 'Prevent 1', lasting from its 2007 introduction until the Prevent Review (HMG, 2011 was the product of the New Labour government and of their reaction to the reality of a domestic Islamist terror threat represented by the 7/7 attacks. It involved a significant local government programme encompassing funding for all local authorities with a certain number of Muslim residents (initially 5%, then 2%, then finally 2,000 or more), via the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). A lot of this money was passed by local authorities onto Muslim community groups, alongside the significant national funding for the new forms of Muslim community representation discussed above. There was also a substantial (and continuing) Home Office programme involving over 300 dedicated Police posts. This involved both uniformed 'Prevent Police Engagement Officers' (PEOs) and dedicated senior, non-uniformed personnel attached to the newly-established regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs).
The 'Prevent 2' phase has developed from the 2011 Review to date, and has involved the removal of the DCLG from Prevent, and a greatly reduced local authority programme (the number of funded 'priority' areas first shrunk considerably but is now quietly growing once again) whose resources are tightly controlled by the Home Office's Office for Security and CounterTerrorism (OSCT). As illustration, even the funded areas must apply directly to the OSCT for any programme of activity and such (inevitably short and limited) programmes must faithfully implement one of the OSCT's 'products'. A key 'Prevent 2' development has been the 'Prevent duty' (HMG, 2015) and its rolling out -this has involved compulsory training for many thousands of public servants on spotting signs of 'radicalisation' and the obligation to refer substantial concerns to Channel.
Such substantial revisions of a national government policy strategy might be seen as proof of it being a 'learning policy', a programme that has used evidence-based analysis and feedback loops to evaluate, modify and so develop but that, in my view, would be a fallacy. Instead, this article argues that the lurches in the focus and content of the Prevent Strategy since 2007 have instead been the product of profound tensions and disagreements within the 'state', between different national government departments, between and within governing political parties and, most substantially, between national and local government (Thomas, 2014) . Here, key local authority areas never wanted Prevent but instead wanted to use community cohesion work as the vehicle for anti-extremism preventative work (Husband and Alam, 2011) .
Similarly, it is far from clear that the DCLG were ever happy with either Prevent per se or with its impacts on the community cohesion policies that they were committed to (O'Toole et al, 2013) , whilst the Prevent Review itself was delayed by major splits within the Coalition government (and within the parties of that government; Thomas, 2012) . This lack of 'state' consensus in itself raises questions about the wisdom of retaining Prevent. Certainly, understanding these intra-state tensions helps to explain the significant shifts and changes over time in the focus and content of Prevent. Within these substantial developments in Prevent can be identified changing notions of 'responsibilisation' and, in response, changing modes of contestation and mediation at ground-level. The meaning and importance of these concepts is discussed below, so allowing the article to then analyse how these concepts have been experienced in Prevent operationalisation.
'Responsibilisation' and 'policy enactment'
'Responsibilisation' is clearly a concept inherent within communitarianist theoretical analysis and associated policy promotion of 'active citizenship' by states in recent decades. The communitarianist position of writers such as Etzioni is that an unintended consequence of the post-war welfare regimes in the USA and the UK has been a loss of the necessary balance between citizen rights and responsibilities:
Communities constantly need to be pulled toward the centre course where individual rights and social responsibilities are properly balanced. (Etzioni, 1995: x) This perspective sees a loss of individual and community responsibility for social change and for addressing social ills as directly flowing from the expansion of government's services and reach, and so argues for policy approaches that re-responsibilise community and individuals. This position does, of course, assume that individual citizens can and should influence structural economic and social realities, such as ethnic segregation, or indeed the violent extremism of small numbers of their fellow citizens. This communitarianist conception of 'responsibilisation' can be seen as being inherent to the approaches to social policy under the British 'New Labour' governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997-2010) . Here, Labour drew on the 'third way' writings of Anthony Giddens (1998) that proposed approaches to government and to social policy implementation based on communitarianist thought. Giddens seemed to both accept Etzioni's concern that the big government of post-war welfarism had sapped personal and community responsibility, so squeezing the space for agency, and Beck's (1992) contention that we now faced a 'risk society'. Giddens argues that individuals must learn to confront risks and to accept both that our own lives will be less secure and that we must individually assume more responsibility and risk:
We have to make our lives in a more active way than was the true of previous generations, and we need more actively to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits we adopt (Giddens, 1998:37) .
Given the prominence of 'third way' and communitarian thought for policymakers over the past two decades or so, there is clearly a revival of interest in theories of human agency within social policy (Greener, 2002) , including around ethnic integration (Thomas, 2011) and preventing violent extremism.
Bourdieu's key concept of 'habitus' is important here, with its focus on a set of dispositions that incline 'agents' to act and react in certain ways. For Bourdieu, 'habitus' orients behaviour without determining it, and the 'fields' within which habitus operates for individuals depends very much on the 'capital' to which they have access (Greener, 2002:691) . Bourdieu discusses how the habitus of actors may enable reflexive behaviour, or agency, but that they may lack the right type of capital, or any capital at all, to make any impact. This clearly suggests the limits on individual agency outside of both economic and social structures, such as poverty, racism and ethnic inequalities, and elitedirected political realities, such as foreign policy and national state domestic polices, yet New Labour's social policies focused heavily on the development of agency and human capital (Levitas, 2005) . It can be argued that Prevent, particularly in phase 1, was consistent with this approach. This 'third way' perspective argues that government can no longer guarantee economic and social security in the same ways even if it wanted to because of the profound global economic and political shifts beyond the control of any one government. It so suggests that asking individuals and communities to accept more 'risk' and to take greater responsibility within social policy is not so much a denial of structural realities and an associated over-privileging of agency than as a pessimistic recognition of a more limited ability for the modern state to effectively control and determine social experiences and identifications. Here, involving communities in responsibility for preventing violent extremism is arguably partially about the weaknesses and limitations of the modern state, this prompting counter-terrorism policy's 'mobilisation of society and the 'civilianisation' of security in the UK' (Sliwinski, 2012:290) .
The concept of policy contestation through ground-level enactment and mediation is a well-established one, particularly in the world of educational research (Braun et al, 2010) . Here, the day-to-day lived reality of educational experience can often look and feel significantly different from the picture painted in elite-level policy discourse, thanks to the ways that ground-level institutions like schools interpret and 'enact' these top-down policy strictures. (Back et al, 2002) . Here, community cohesion policies were being understood and enacted by front-line agencies and their staff, in this case youth workers, in ways that respected and worked with specific ethnic and faith identifications but which also promoted stronger forms of commonality and dialogue through 'two-stage', contact-theory based youth activities (Thomas, 2011) . This perspective suggests that we cannot fully understand a highly-contested national policy regime such as Prevent without drawing on ground-level empirical evidence about the ways in which it has actually been understood, practiced and contested.
Responsibilisation and contestation in 'Prevent 1'
The previous discussions highlight that responsibilisation was clearly a central and consistent part of wider New Labour social policy (Levitas, 2005) . However, Basia Spalek (2013) identifies that utilising such approaches of 'responsibilisation' that funded and trusted communities to participate in preventative activities through the Prevent Strategy was a new departure for counter-terrorism policies:
'The focus on resilience, and in particular, community resilience, illustrates how important it is considered for individuals within communities to be responsible and active citizens, to be moral agents and help prevent terrorism' (Spalek, 2013:79) .
Here, Spalek draws on Durodie (2005) to highlight a new focus on 'cultural resilience' within communities, rather than the traditional state focus on 'technical resilience' being projected on to communities. In 'Prevent 1', Muslim communities were responsibilised through the monocultural focus, funding and priorities of national and local Prevent work outlined above and Muslims were arguably cast as moral agents of terrorism prevention (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011) . This approach and its sheer scale, could be cited as proof of the inherently Islamophobic nature of Prevent but it can also be understood as a 'third-way' inspired approach to partnership that both acknowledged the need to avoid the stigmatisiation of Prevent being 'done' to British Muslims and which also acknowledged both the state's lack of undertstanding of the complex dynamics of Islamist violent extremism and its own limited ability to make progress in preventing it. (Kundnani, 2009; Bahadur Lamb, 2012) . However, some outliers remained, with Leicester City Council insisting on Prevent being delivered via a community cohesion-focussed third sector organisation, rather than the local authority, an exceptional arrangment that remains in place to date (O'Toole et al, 2013) .
It was indeed 'the responsibility of Muslims and Muslim communities to perform their duty of being 'frontline'' vigilant watchers' in their Mosques

Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within 'Prevent 2'
'Prevent 1', its particular approach to responsibilisation and its particular opportunities for local contestation came to an end for a number of reasons.
Some of these reasons were exposed by the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee Inquiry (2010), which arguably (Thomas, 2010) showed Prevent to be 'failed and friendless'. Despite the limited but real space for contestation and variation allowed to Muslim communities and local authorities by Prevent 1's approach, any perceived benefits of such funding (at a time of growing austerity) were heavily outweighed by the fundamental flaws outlined above and the resulting reputational damage to all participating. Evidence from community groups detailed the securitisation and stigmatisation inherent in Prevent, whilst local government evidence suggested that Prevent was damaging community cohesion, a claim subsequently shown to be well-founded (Thomas, 2014) Here, within a climate of (Islamophobic-driven: Hussain and Bagguley, 2012) 'unease' (Huysmans, 2009) 
Developing forms of contestation in 'Prevent 2'?
Despite the greatly restricted potential for local authorities and Muslim communities to mediate Prevent work outlined above and the overt nature of Prevent 2's responsibilisation of front-line professionals, it is still, however, possible to identify emerging forms of ground-level mediation and contestation.
Firstly, research around how schools and colleges in two key regions of England are enacting the Prevent legal duty (Busher et al, 2017) suggests that front-line educational respondents do not find the 'safeguarding' element of the Prevent duty, how Prevent relates to broader school/college 'safeguarding' systems and approaches in response to varied risks and vulnerabilities faced by students, problematic in theory -it is an approach that they see as realistic in relation to broad understandings of 'vulnerability' for this age group. Data also suggests that practitioners and their institutions demonstrate awareness of concerns around Prevent's stigmatising focus and display a professional determination to ensure that this is not replicated within their own individual and institutional implementation through, for instance, a strengthening of citizenship education that addresses all forms of extremism and intolerance.
Alongside this, there is evidence of contestation through a, largely selfgenerated, curriculum response in schools and colleges that foregrounds issues of equality, anti-racism and citizenship studies in recognition of the need for positive, preventative measures that address all students. Criticisms of Prevent from such respondents focus on the lack of Prevent policy support for, or concern with, such meaningful educational processes, a view which echoes broader academic critiques (Thomas, 2016) .This research evidence offers a significantly different understanding of Prevent's implementation in education to those dominant in political discourse presently (OSFJI, 2016) , largely because of evidence around policy contestation and enactment by, and the agency of, front-line educators and their institutions.
Similarly, there is some evidence of local authorities and Muslim community groups contesting the 'Prevent 2' agenda. One example is Kirklees local authority in West Yorkshire. Kirklees is a funded 'priority area' but this only brings very limited funds as highlighted above. They, like other local authorities though, have the 'Prevent duty' and the concurrent reality of local residents having been involved in terrorist plots or having travelled to Syria. Their response was to step outside of OSCT control by establishing a 'Prevent young people's engagement team', a team of youth and community workers seconded from other departments and so paid for by the authority's own budget at a times of very real cuts forced by national austerity policies (Thomas et al, 2017) . This team did preventative educational activities with young people from diverse ethnic, faith and geographic communities through schools and community groups and also worked with individuals referred to Channel, rather than leaving the Police to lead such an intervention. This local initiative contained an implicit critique of Prevent's lack of concern with actual educational processes (and the practitioner skills and approaches that go with them: Thomas, 2016) by taking the initiative themselves, rather than waiting for a change in national policy. This amplifies the national fact that some of the most interesting anti-extremism preventative educational work to date has been done outside of any Prevent funding, such as the Welsh-based 'Think' project (Cantle and Thomas, 2014) .
Muslim community groups also continue to actively contest Prevent in a number of ways. One is through overt political activity to debate, monitor and campaign against Prevent by Muslim civil society campaigning groups such as MEND (www.mend.org.uk/together-against-prevent/ ) and CAGE. Another is the community-based work to engage with young Muslims at risk of radicalisation (Shabi, 2016) through processes of youth work that are entirely funded by the community themselves -such groups do not seek and would not accept Prevent funding from the state, even if it was still available, but they do such work nevertheless. A similar Muslim community-directed approach that shuns state counter-terrorism funding can be detected in countries such as Australia (Safi, 2015) .
Conclusion
This article has argued that counter-terrorism policy-makers, both in Britain and internationally, have much to learn by more fully understanding the British ground-level experience of Prevent policy contestation and enactment. They arguably also need to accept that national government efforts to rigidly dictate and micro-manage the operation of preventative counter-terrorism policies at ground level are both unrealistic and counter-productive. Similarly, local authorities try to utilise 'policy space' to develop more productive local versions of Prevent, whilst Muslim community groups contest in a number of creative and productive ways, including doing (on an unfunded basis) the sort of community-led youth engagement work that 'Prevent 1' was trying to develop.
Failure to recognise and critically analyse this shifting complexity and shifting experiences of responsibilisation and contestation means that we risk only partially understanding the lived experiences of Britain's problematic Prevent Strategy.
